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645import { test, afterEach } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import express from "express";
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { join } from "node:path";
import type { AddressInfo } from "node:net";
import { Store } from "../src/store/db.ts";
import {
makeAuthMiddleware,
__clearTokenCache,
__seedRejectedCredential,
__rejectedCredentialUntil,
} from "../src/auth/middleware.ts";
import type { AuthedRequest } from "../src/auth/middleware.ts";
import { meRouter } from "../src/routes/me.ts";
import { sessionsRouter } from "../src/routes/sessions.ts";
import { uploadRateLimit } from "../src/util/requestLimits.ts";
import { anonymousToken, anonymousTokenWarning, normalizeTrustProxy } from "../src/config.ts";
import type { IrisConfig, RateLimitConfig } from "../src/config.ts";
// `github.anonymous_token` (#456): a deployment can serve callers who send NO credential
// as one shared identity, so a visitor can try the demo without a GitHub account.
//
// Everything worth pinning here is a property that cannot be seen from a response body,
// because the whole point of the feature is that an anonymous request looks like an
// ordinary successful one:
//
// * WHICH missing-credential shape it answers for. A request with no header is served;
// a request with a BAD header is still refused. Serving that second one would move a
// client that was trying to be someone into a shared account's session space, and
// every response on the way would be a 200.
// * That the session LIST is closed to anonymous callers. Ownership is `github_user_id`
// and nothing else, so one shared credential makes "this user's sessions" mean "every
// anonymous visitor's sessions" — a stranger's document, listed to whoever asks next.
// * That the shared identity is not one rate-limit bucket. Every anonymous caller
// resolves to the same user id, so keying uploads on the user would put the whole
// internet in a single `upload_per_minute`, and it would look like a working
// deployment that is mysteriously always at its limit.
// * That the credential from config is VALIDATED like any other, rather than trusted
// because an operator typed it.
//
// And the default: with the key unset, none of the above is reachable and a token is
// required on every call.
//
// Each of those is pinned by a test that was MEASURED red, not assumed to be: removing the
// `req.anonymous` guard from the session list returns 200 with `ses_anon_one` in the body —
// a session owned by the shared identity, so in a real deployment whatever the previous
// visitor uploaded. Broadening the served shape from `!header` to `!match` serves
// `Basic …`; dropping the flag from `/v1/me` or from `userKey` reddens one test each, and
// never setting it at all reddens two.
const ANON_TOKEN = "gho_anon_demo";
const ANON_USER = { id: 4242, login: "iris-demo-bot" };
const USER_TOKEN = "gho_real_person";
const REAL_USER = { id: 909, login: "a-real-person" };
// A token GitHub cannot answer ABOUT, as distinct from one it rejects. Both leave the
// anonymous identity unresolved and both must leave a signed-in caller working, but only
// one of them is a final answer — see `isRejectedCredential` in auth/github.ts, and
// `rejectedCredentials` in auth/middleware.ts for what is done with it.
const UNANSWERABLE_TOKEN = "gho_github_is_having_a_day";
// A GitHub that knows exactly two tokens, so "the anonymous credential was validated" and
// "the caller's own token was validated" are distinguishable, and anything else 401s.
async function mockGitHub(): Promise<{
base: string;
close: () => void;
calls: () => number;
// Start accepting a token this mock was rejecting, as the shared identity. For the case
// that cannot be tested with a static mock: GitHub answering `Bad credentials` for a
// credential that is actually fine, and then recovering.
recover: (token: string) => void;
}> {
const app = express();
const state = { calls: 0 };
const recovered = new Set<string>();
app.get("/user", (req, res) => {
state.calls++;
const auth = req.header("authorization") ?? "";
if (auth === `Bearer ${ANON_TOKEN}`) return void res.json(ANON_USER);
if (auth === `Bearer ${USER_TOKEN}`) return void res.json(REAL_USER);
// Deliberately a 5xx and not a 401: a status that says "ask again later".
if (auth === `Bearer ${UNANSWERABLE_TOKEN}`) return void res.status(502).json({ message: "Bad gateway" });
for (const t of recovered) if (auth === `Bearer ${t}`) return void res.json(ANON_USER);
res.status(401).json({ message: "Bad credentials" });
});
const server = app.listen(0);
await new Promise((r) => server.once("listening", r));
return {
base: `http://127.0.0.1:${(server.address() as AddressInfo).port}`,
close: () => server.close(),
calls: () => state.calls,
recover: (token: string) => recovered.add(token),
};
}
function cfg(apiBase: string, dir: string, anonToken?: string): IrisConfig {
return {
server: { port: 0, base_url: "http://localhost:0" },
storage: { data_dir: dir, agents_dir: "agents", database: join(dir, "iris.sqlite") },
github: {
client_id: "Iv1.test",
client_secret: "s",
upstream_repo: "https://github.com/o/r",
api_base_url: apiBase,
oauth_base_url: "https://github.com",
anonymous_token: anonToken,
},
providers: { default: "openrouter", openrouter: { api_key: "k", default_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.6" } },
defaults: { max_review_iterations: 3, extraction_concurrency: 5, max_concurrent_runs: 2, recheck_sample_size: 1 },
};
}
// The real auth middleware in front of the real `/v1/me` and `/v1/sessions` routers, so
// each request below runs the branch under test rather than a re-implementation of it.
async function harness(anonToken?: string) {
__clearTokenCache();
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "iris-anon-"));
const gh = await mockGitHub();
const config = cfg(gh.base, dir, anonToken);
const store = new Store(join(dir, "iris.sqlite"));
const app = express();
const auth = makeAuthMiddleware(store, config);
app.use("/v1/me", auth, meRouter(config));
app.use("/v1/sessions", auth, sessionsRouter(config, store));
const server = app.listen(0);
await new Promise((r) => server.once("listening", r));
const base = `http://127.0.0.1:${(server.address() as AddressInfo).port}`;
return {
store,
ghCalls: gh.calls,
ghRecover: gh.recover,
// No `headers` key at all when nothing is passed: an empty object would still be a
// request with no Authorization header, but being explicit is what this suite is about.
fetch: (path: string, headers?: Record<string, string>) =>
fetch(`${base}${path}`, headers ? { headers } : undefined),
close: () => {
server.close();
gh.close();
// The database goes with the temp directory, as in test/token-cache.test.ts: the
// handle is process-local and the file is about to not exist.
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
},
};
}
afterEach(() => {
__clearTokenCache();
});
test("with no anonymous_token, a request without a credential is still refused", async () => {
const h = await harness(undefined);
try {
const res = await h.fetch("/v1/me");
assert.equal(res.status, 401);
const body = (await res.json()) as { error: { code: string; message: string } };
assert.equal(body.error.code, "unauthorized");
assert.match(body.error.message, /Missing or malformed Authorization header/);
// And nothing was asked of GitHub: there was no credential to validate, so the
// refusal costs no outbound call.
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 0);
} finally {
h.close();
}
});
test("a whitespace-only anonymous_token is not a credential, end to end", async () => {
// The shape an unset `${IRIS_ANONYMOUS_TOKEN}` and a blank YAML value both arrive as. Its own
// test rather than an assertion inside the unit test above, because what is at stake is which
// deployment an operator actually gets: the config helper agreeing with itself proves nothing
// if the middleware asks a different question.
const h = await harness(" ");
try {
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me").then((r) => r.status), 401);
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 0, "a blank credential must not be sent to GitHub for validation");
} finally {
h.close();
}
});
test("with anonymous_token set, a request with no credential is served and says so", async () => {
const h = await harness(ANON_TOKEN);
try {
const res = await h.fetch("/v1/me");
assert.equal(res.status, 200);
const body = (await res.json()) as { github_login: string; github_user_id: number; anonymous?: boolean };
// The identity is the configured credential's, and `anonymous: true` is the only
// thing in the body that says the caller is not that person: without it a demo page
// would greet a visitor who never signed in as `iris-demo-bot`.
assert.equal(body.github_login, ANON_USER.login);
assert.equal(body.github_user_id, ANON_USER.id);
assert.equal(body.anonymous, true);
// Validated through GitHub like any other token, not trusted because it came from
// config — one `GET /user`, and the second request is served from the same cache a
// user's token uses.
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 1);
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me").then((r) => r.status), 200);
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 1);
} finally {
h.close();
}
});
test("a signed-in caller is unchanged, and carries no anonymous flag", async () => {
const h = await harness(ANON_TOKEN);
try {
const res = await h.fetch("/v1/me", { authorization: `Bearer ${USER_TOKEN}` });
assert.equal(res.status, 200);
const body = (await res.json()) as { github_login: string; anonymous?: boolean };
assert.equal(body.github_login, REAL_USER.login);
// Absent, not `false`. The key means "this response is not about a person", so it
// appears only in the mode it describes.
assert.equal("anonymous" in body, false);
} finally {
h.close();
}
});
// The two shapes below are two tests and not one, because they fail through different
// mechanisms and a single test stops at its first failed assertion. `Bearer <expired>`
// MATCHES the header pattern and dies in validation; `Basic …` never matches and dies at
// the guard. Widening either one leaves the other's assertion unrun and unreported, which
// is the state where a reader edits the first test to match the new behaviour and only
// discovers the second on a later run.
test("a credential GitHub rejects is refused, not downgraded to the shared identity", async () => {
const h = await harness(ANON_TOKEN);
try {
// The tempting behaviour — fall back to the anonymous credential — would serve this
// caller 200 under a bot account, so its uploads would land somewhere it cannot list
// and its feedback would be filed as someone else. The failure it needs to see is its
// own expired token.
const rejected = await h.fetch("/v1/me", { authorization: "Bearer gho_expired" });
assert.equal(rejected.status, 401);
assert.match(((await rejected.json()) as { error: { message: string } }).error.message, /Token validation failed/);
// And the deployment is still serving anonymous callers, so the 401 above is about
// this request rather than the mode being off.
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me").then((r) => r.status), 200);
} finally {
h.close();
}
});
test("a header that is not a usable Bearer is refused, not read as a missing one", async () => {
const h = await harness(ANON_TOKEN);
try {
// Present but not a Bearer at all: still a client trying to authenticate, so still a
// 401 rather than a silent downgrade.
const wrongScheme = await h.fetch("/v1/me", { authorization: "Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz" });
assert.equal(wrongScheme.status, 401);
assert.match(
((await wrongScheme.json()) as { error: { message: string } }).error.message,
/Missing or malformed Authorization header/,
);
// An empty Bearer, the shape closest to "no header", must land on the same side of the
// line: the guard is `!header`, not "no token in the header", so a caller who sends the
// scheme and nothing else is refused rather than served.
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me", { authorization: "Bearer " }).then((r) => r.status), 401);
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me").then((r) => r.status), 200);
} finally {
h.close();
}
});
test("the session list refuses an anonymous caller and still serves a signed-in one", async () => {
const h = await harness(ANON_TOKEN);
try {
// Two sessions that exist: one owned by the shared anonymous identity, one by a real
// user. Written through the store rather than by upload, because what is under test is
// who may READ the list.
h.store.upsertUser({ github_user_id: ANON_USER.id, github_login: ANON_USER.login }, 1);
h.store.upsertUser({ github_user_id: REAL_USER.id, github_login: REAL_USER.login }, 1);
h.store.createSession({ session_id: "ses_anon_one", github_user_id: ANON_USER.id, image_count: 1, iterations_max: 1 });
h.store.createSession({ session_id: "ses_real_one", github_user_id: REAL_USER.id, image_count: 1, iterations_max: 1 });
const refused = await h.fetch("/v1/sessions");
assert.equal(refused.status, 403);
const body = (await refused.json()) as { error: { code: string; message: string } };
assert.equal(body.error.code, "anonymous_session_list");
// The message has to name the remedy, because a client that just uploaded has the one
// thing that still works and no way to guess it from a bare 403. Both remedies are
// asserted, one per caller who can land here: the session id for a visitor, and the
// account for whoever holds the shared credential (see the test below).
assert.match(body.error.message, /session id returned by POST \/v1\/sessions/);
assert.match(body.error.message, /sign in with a different one/);
// The refusal is about the caller, not the route: the same deployment lists a
// signed-in user's own sessions, and lists only theirs.
const listed = await h.fetch("/v1/sessions", { authorization: `Bearer ${USER_TOKEN}` });
assert.equal(listed.status, 200);
const page = (await listed.json()) as { sessions: { session_id: string }[] };
assert.deepEqual(
page.sessions.map((s) => s.session_id),
["ses_real_one"],
);
// And what an anonymous caller keeps: the session it holds the id of. This is the
// narrowing the mode trades for — reachability by id, which is `ses_` + a ULID rather
// than an owner check.
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/sessions/ses_anon_one").then((r) => r.status), 200);
} finally {
h.close();
}
});
test("the shared account's own token gets the same refusal, not the list", async () => {
// Round 1 of #458 found this: the flag was keyed on the missing HEADER, so the one caller
// who can reach the shared identity another way — by presenting its token normally — was
// served the page the 403 exists to prevent. Measured before the fix: `200` and
// `{"sessions":[{"session_id":"ses_anon_one",…}]}`, a visitor's document listed by id to
// whoever holds that account's token, from anywhere, with no access to the server.
//
// Docs tell the operator to use a token "of your own", so the caller is not hypothetical:
// it is the operator signing in to their own deployment.
const h = await harness(ANON_TOKEN);
try {
h.store.upsertUser({ github_user_id: ANON_USER.id, github_login: ANON_USER.login }, 1);
h.store.createSession({
session_id: "ses_anon_one",
github_user_id: ANON_USER.id,
image_count: 1,
iterations_max: 1,
});
const res = await h.fetch("/v1/sessions", { authorization: `Bearer ${ANON_TOKEN}` });
assert.equal(res.status, 403);
const body = (await res.json()) as { error: { code: string; message: string } };
assert.equal(body.error.code, "anonymous_session_list");
// And the message has to be usable by THIS caller. "Sign in with GitHub" was the only
// advice before, which is no advice at all for someone who is signed in.
assert.match(body.error.message, /github\.anonymous_token/);
// `/v1/me` agrees, because one flag decides both. A client that trusted `anonymous`
// to mean "no credential was sent" would be wrong; it means "this is the shared
// identity", which is the thing every downstream owner check is keyed on.
const me = (await h.fetch("/v1/me", { authorization: `Bearer ${ANON_TOKEN}` }).then((r) => r.json())) as {
anonymous?: boolean;
};
assert.equal(me.anonymous, true);
} finally {
h.close();
}
});
test("resolving the shared identity costs one lookup and does not break a signed-in caller", async () => {
const h = await harness(ANON_TOKEN);
try {
// A signed-in request has to resolve TWO tokens the first time — its own, and the
// anonymous credential it is compared against — and then neither again.
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me", { authorization: `Bearer ${USER_TOKEN}` }).then((r) => r.status), 200);
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 2, "the caller's token and the shared credential, once each");
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me", { authorization: `Bearer ${USER_TOKEN}` }).then((r) => r.status), 200);
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 2, "memoized for the life of the process, so no per-request cost");
// And the identity comparison did not misfire: a real user is not anonymous because a
// deployment happens to have the key set.
const me = (await h.fetch("/v1/me", { authorization: `Bearer ${USER_TOKEN}` }).then((r) => r.json())) as {
github_login: string;
anonymous?: boolean;
};
assert.equal(me.github_login, REAL_USER.login);
assert.equal("anonymous" in me, false);
} finally {
h.close();
}
});
test("a REJECTED shared credential is asked about once, not once per request", async () => {
// The failure mode the lookup above introduces if it is not contained: the deployment's
// own credential is revoked or mistyped, so resolving it throws — on a request that has
// nothing to do with it. Two things have to be true at once, and they pull in opposite
// directions: a caller's working token must not fail because the operator's is broken,
// AND the failed lookup must not repeat forever. A mistyped config value is not a blip;
// it is a permanent state, so retrying it charges every authenticated request an extra
// uncached `GET /user` for the life of the process — including requests whose own token
// is a cache hit and would otherwise make no outbound call at all. Round 2 of #458.
const h = await harness("gho_operator_typo");
try {
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me", { authorization: `Bearer ${USER_TOKEN}` }).then((r) => r.status), 200);
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 2, "the caller's token, and one attempt at the shared credential");
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me", { authorization: `Bearer ${USER_TOKEN}` }).then((r) => r.status), 200);
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 2, "asked GitHub again about a credential it had already rejected");
// Latching is only safe because a rejected credential cannot serve an anonymous
// request either — so while the flag is set, nothing new can reach the shared identity
// for the guard to have protected. That is this assertion, not a separate concern.
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me").then((r) => r.status), 401);
// The guard is off rather than misapplied: the signed-in caller is still not anonymous.
const me = (await h.fetch("/v1/me", { authorization: `Bearer ${USER_TOKEN}` }).then((r) => r.json())) as {
anonymous?: boolean;
};
assert.equal("anonymous" in me, false);
} finally {
h.close();
}
});
test("an ANONYMOUS request does not re-ask about a rejected credential either", async () => {
// Round 3 of #458: the first version of this cache was consulted only on the signed-in
// branch, so the identical cost stayed on the half an OUTSIDE caller drives. A request
// with no header goes straight into `resolveUserId`, and a failure writes nothing to the
// positive cache, so with a mistyped config value every unauthenticated request paid an
// uncached `GET /user` — with no timeout — before its 401.
const h = await harness("gho_operator_typo");
try {
const first = await h.fetch("/v1/me");
assert.equal(first.status, 401);
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 1, "the one lookup that learns the credential is rejected");
const second = await h.fetch("/v1/me");
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 1, "asked GitHub again about a credential it had already rejected");
// The saving must not be observable. A cached rejection and a fresh one are the same
// answer to the caller, down to the body — otherwise this becomes a way to ask whether
// the deployment has spoken to GitHub lately.
assert.equal(second.status, first.status);
assert.deepEqual(await second.json(), await first.json());
} finally {
h.close();
}
});
test("a rejection is cached for a bounded window, not for the life of the process", async () => {
// Why this is a TTL and not a flag that latches: GitHub's auth can answer `Bad
// credentials` for a token that is fine, and a latch would then 401 every anonymous
// caller until a human restarted the service — trading a per-request lookup for an
// outage. Recovery has to need no restart, so the expiry is the mechanism and this is the
// test of it.
//
// Seeded rather than waited for: the TTL is five minutes. Same device as the positive
// cache's expiry test (test/token-cache.test.ts seeds a stale entry rather than sleeping).
const BROKEN = "gho_transiently_rejected";
const h = await harness(BROKEN);
try {
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me").then((r) => r.status), 401);
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 1);
assert.notEqual(__rejectedCredentialUntil(BROKEN), undefined, "the rejection was not recorded at all");
// GitHub starts answering for it again — the credential was never actually bad.
h.ghRecover(BROKEN);
// Still inside the window: the cached rejection stands, and nothing is asked.
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me").then((r) => r.status), 401);
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 1);
// Now the window has passed.
__seedRejectedCredential(BROKEN, Date.now() - 1);
const res = await h.fetch("/v1/me");
assert.equal(res.status, 200, "a recovered credential stayed refused past its window");
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 2, "the expired entry did not cause a re-ask");
const body = (await res.json()) as { github_login: string; anonymous?: boolean };
assert.equal(body.github_login, ANON_USER.login);
// And the guard is armed again on the same request, not one later: this response is the
// one that re-resolves the shared identity.
assert.equal(body.anonymous, true);
// The expired entry is dropped on read rather than accumulating.
assert.equal(__rejectedCredentialUntil(BROKEN), undefined, "an expired entry was left in the map");
} finally {
h.close();
}
});
test("serving a cached rejection does not push its own expiry out", async () => {
// Round 4 of #458, and the defect the TTL was introduced to prevent, reintroduced by the
// mechanism that answers it. The cached refusal is raised as `userLookupError(401)` so the
// reply comes from one place — but that error is indistinguishable from a fresh rejection
// to the `catch` that RECORDS rejections, so every anonymous request served from the cache
// rewrote the expiry to `now + TTL_MS`. Any deployment seeing an anonymous request more
// often than once per TTL — which is every deployment that turned the mode on for a reason
// — never reaches the expiry, so a TTL under traffic was exactly the process-lifetime latch
// it replaced: one spurious `Bad credentials` would 401 anonymous callers until a restart,
// and hold the round-1 session-list guard off for that whole time.
//
// The window test above cannot see it, because forcing the expiry with a seed OVERWRITES a
// slid entry. So this asserts the stored instant itself, and pins it to a known value
// first: a renewal then moves it by the whole TTL rather than by however many milliseconds
// the two requests happen to be apart, which would be a race against the clock.
const BROKEN = "gho_transiently_rejected";
const h = await harness(BROKEN);
try {
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me").then((r) => r.status), 401);
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 1);
const until = Date.now() + 1_000;
__seedRejectedCredential(BROKEN, until);
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me").then((r) => r.status), 401);
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 1, "the cached answer was served, so GitHub was not asked");
assert.equal(
__rejectedCredentialUntil(BROKEN),
until,
"an anonymous request served FROM the cache extended it, so the window never closes under traffic",
);
} finally {
h.close();
}
});
test("a CALLER's rejected token is never recorded as a rejected credential", async () => {
// The bound on the negative cache. It has no ceiling and no eviction sweep, which is only
// safe because nothing a caller sends can create an entry — a map keyed on whatever
// arrives in a header is the unbounded one `MAX_ENTRIES` exists to prevent, and distinct
// bearer strings are free to produce. Two shapes have to be checked, because the guard is
// `servedAnonymously` rather than a comparison against the configured value: an ordinary
// bad token, and a caller presenting the deployment's OWN credential.
const h = await harness(ANON_TOKEN);
try {
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me", { authorization: "Bearer gho_not_a_real_token" }).then((r) => r.status), 401);
assert.equal(__rejectedCredentialUntil("gho_not_a_real_token"), undefined, "a caller's token entered the map");
// The deployment's own credential, presented by a caller, resolves fine here — the point
// is that this path cannot write to the map even when the token IS the configured one.
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me", { authorization: `Bearer ${ANON_TOKEN}` }).then((r) => r.status), 200);
assert.equal(__rejectedCredentialUntil(ANON_TOKEN), undefined);
} finally {
h.close();
}
});
test("a shared credential GitHub cannot answer about is retried, not latched off", async () => {
// The other half, and the reason the memoization above is keyed on 401 alone. A 502 (or a
// 5xx, a 403 rate limit, a thrown fetch) says GitHub could not answer, not that the
// answer is no — and the credential behind it may be perfectly good, still serving
// anonymous sessions the moment GitHub recovers. Latching there would switch the guard
// off for the rest of the process over a blip, which is the session list this PR exists
// to close. So this one pays the repeated lookup, on purpose.
const h = await harness(UNANSWERABLE_TOKEN);
try {
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me", { authorization: `Bearer ${USER_TOKEN}` }).then((r) => r.status), 200);
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 2, "the caller's token, and one attempt at the shared credential");
assert.equal(await h.fetch("/v1/me", { authorization: `Bearer ${USER_TOKEN}` }).then((r) => r.status), 200);
assert.equal(h.ghCalls(), 3, "gave up on a credential GitHub had merely failed to answer about");
} finally {
h.close();
}
});
// The rate-limit key, driven through `uploadRateLimit` with the auth result stubbed: what
// is under test is which bucket a request lands in, and reaching the real upload route
// would mean standing up multer and a pipeline to assert something decided before either.
//
// Two addresses from one process, which needs `trust proxy` — the same device
// test/request-limits.test.ts uses for the forged-header case, and the only way to have
// two callers in one test file.
//
// Stubbing the auth result means these two cannot see whether a real request arrives at the
// limiter with the flag already on. That it does is an ordering fact, checked by reading
// rather than asserted here: `uploadBudget` is mounted inside the sessions router
// (src/routes/sessions.ts:274), and src/index.ts:144 mounts that router behind `auth`. The
// `/v1` general limiter is the one that runs first, which is why it has no anonymous
// branch at all.
async function serveUploadLimit(
limits: Partial<RateLimitConfig>,
stub: (req: AuthedRequest) => void,
): Promise<{ as: (ip: string) => Promise<number>; close: () => void }> {
const app = express();
app.set("trust proxy", normalizeTrustProxy(1));
const config = {
server: { port: 0, base_url: "http://localhost:0", rate_limits: limits },
} as unknown as IrisConfig;
app.use(
"/upload",
(req, _res, next) => {
stub(req as AuthedRequest);
next();
},
uploadRateLimit(config),
(_req, res) => void res.json({ ok: true }),
);
const server = app.listen(0);
await new Promise((r) => server.once("listening", r));
const url = `http://127.0.0.1:${(server.address() as AddressInfo).port}/upload`;
return {
as: (ip: string) => fetch(url, { method: "POST", headers: { "x-forwarded-for": ip } }).then((r) => r.status),
close: () => server.close(),
};
}
test("anonymous uploads are counted per address, not against the shared identity", async () => {
// Every anonymous caller is `iris-demo-bot` as far as the store is concerned. Keyed on
// that user id, one upload per minute would be one upload per minute for the whole
// internet — and the symptom is a deployment that looks healthy and is permanently at
// its limit for everyone but the first visitor.
const anon = await serveUploadLimit({ upload_per_minute: 1 }, (req) => {
req.user = { github_user_id: ANON_USER.id, github_login: ANON_USER.login, max_review_iterations: 1 } as AuthedRequest["user"];
req.anonymous = true;
});
try {
assert.equal(await anon.as("10.0.0.1"), 200);
assert.equal(await anon.as("10.0.0.2"), 200, "a second visitor must not be paying for the first");
assert.equal(await anon.as("10.0.0.1"), 429, "and each address still has a budget of its own");
} finally {
anon.close();
}
});
test("a signed-in user's uploads are still counted per user, across addresses", async () => {
// The other axis, and the reason the branch is on `anonymous` rather than on "is there a
// user": per-user keying is what makes Iris usable from a campus NAT, so switching
// uploads to per-address wholesale would be a regression that this file's other test
// could not see. One user, two addresses, one budget.
const signedIn = await serveUploadLimit({ upload_per_minute: 1 }, (req) => {
req.user = { github_user_id: REAL_USER.id, github_login: REAL_USER.login, max_review_iterations: 1 } as AuthedRequest["user"];
});
try {
assert.equal(await signedIn.as("10.0.0.1"), 200);
assert.equal(await signedIn.as("10.0.0.2"), 429, "the same user from a second address shares one bucket");
} finally {
signedIn.close();
}
});
test("one rule decides whether the key is set, so the warning cannot contradict the behaviour", () => {
// `${IRIS_ANONYMOUS_TOKEN}` unset expands to `""`, not to a missing key (`expandEnv`), and a
// YAML value can be whitespace. Both mean OFF, and both have to mean off in the same way in
// two places: the middleware decides whether to serve an anonymous request, and the boot log
// tells the operator which deployment they have. Split rules here would print "anonymous
// access is on" over a service that 401s every anonymous call — a bug hunt in the wrong half.
const off = (v: string | undefined) => ({ github: { anonymous_token: v } }) as unknown as IrisConfig;
assert.equal(anonymousToken(off(undefined)), undefined);
assert.equal(anonymousToken(off("")), undefined);
assert.equal(anonymousToken(off(" ")), undefined);
// And a real value survives, trimmed — a token pasted with a trailing newline still works.
assert.equal(anonymousToken(off(` ${ANON_TOKEN}\n`)), ANON_TOKEN);
});
test("the boot warning fires only when the key is set, and never prints the credential", () => {
assert.equal(anonymousTokenWarning(undefined), undefined);
assert.equal(anonymousTokenWarning(""), undefined);
const warning = anonymousTokenWarning(ANON_TOKEN) ?? "";
// The four consequences an operator cannot see from outside, each named. Asserted
// because this string is the only place the deployment states its own policy, and a
// warning that says "anonymous access is on" without saying what that costs is the
// version of this that would have shipped.
assert.match(warning, /GET \/v1\/sessions refuses them/);
assert.match(warning, /rate limited by address/);
assert.match(warning, /filed under this credential's account/);
// The fourth is the one an operator acts on when CHOOSING the account, and it is the
// only consequence that lands on them rather than on a visitor: this token's own
// account gets the same 403. Round 1 of #458 is what added it — before the fix the
// account was exempt, and being exempt is what made the token a session list for
// every visitor. So the warning has to ask for a dedicated account and say why.
assert.match(warning, /this credential's own account gets it too/);
assert.match(warning, /no person needs/, "asked for nothing of the operator");
assert.match(warning, /lists every visitor's/, "named the requirement without its reason");
// A boot log gets pasted into issues. This is the one config value that is a live
// GitHub token for a real account, so no part of it appears here.
assert.equal(warning.includes(ANON_TOKEN), false);
assert.equal(warning.includes(ANON_TOKEN.slice(0, 8)), false);
});